How many people is Google censoring? Google is censoring 99% of my content. Elon Musk never fixed any of the evil censorship that Jack Dorsey and his team built into the X software. We do not have online freedom of speech.
Wednesday, September 30, 2026
BREAKING: Hijacking fears after Israel-bound flight DIVERTED to Saudia Arabia.
When you think you cannot accomplish something, please think about George Washington. When you read about what he did, most people think he accomplished the impossible.
Unlike the successful Siege of Boston, the efforts to defend the city of
New York ended in near disaster for the Continental Army and the cause
of independence.
In what proved to be the largest battle of the
Revolutionary War in terms of total combatants, Washington’s forces on
August 22, 1776, were flanked out of their positions atop the Gowanus
Heights (part of today’s modern Brooklyn) and soundly defeated by
William Howe's roughly 20,000 man force on Long Island.
It was during these dark days at the close of 1776 that Thomas Paine’s words from the recently published American Crisis rang most true:
“These are the times that try men’s souls…the summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands it now deserves the love and thanks of man and woman.”
I just BUSTED evil Google / YouTube again unfairly censoring my comments and content. They are doing this to many Republicans and Conservatives.
Google AI Overview
— Sara Jones - 🇺🇸 - I support USA President Trump (@SaraJonesUSA) September 4, 2026
Neither https://t.co/9uxu5GeZbH nor https://t.co/rwVlElTBMk currently show any indexed pages in the Google search engine.
How to Check Indexing StatusYou can test if any website is in Google's database by running a search query with the site:…
x.com/SaraJonesUSA/status/2095823427471081784?s=20
Below see the screen shot with my comment missing.
I think that Google / YouTube is unfairly censoring Republicans and Conversatives. It is a form of illegal election interference.
Evil Google wants to control what you think, far left Communist Democrats are NEVER censored like I am.
*
— Tom -🇺🇸 🇺🇸- I follow back Patriots (@TomNo1Patriot) October 17, 2025
Hello .@sundarpichai
I just BUSTED .@YouTube censoring my comment again.
You are doing this to many Conversatives/ Republicans.
It says Zero comments because only I can see my comment. Google / YouTube think that they are clever, yet I am still able to BUST them. pic.twitter.com/eZ12fqHWmN
Tuesday, September 29, 2026
Sen. Kennedy questions Jack Smith in Judiciary Committee: "You make me want to throw up in my mouth".
I think that Jack Smith is an evil person that should be in prison for what he did.
Unfortunately, he will not be prosecuted for what he did to President Trump.
Special Counsel cases (appointed November 2022)
Attorney General Merrick Garland assigned Smith two preexisting investigations. Smith obtained grand-jury indictments in both; neither went to trial. He submitted a final report in January 2025 concluding the evidence met the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, then resigned. Volume 1 (election case) has been discussed publicly; Volume 2 (documents case) remains under a court injunction blocking release. Election-interference case (D.D.C.)
August 2023 indictment charged four felonies: conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding, obstruction of an official proceeding, and conspiracy against rights. Prosecutors alleged a scheme involving false fraud claims, fake electors, and pressure on Vice President Pence, state officials, and the Justice Department after the 2020 election. The Supreme Court in July 2024 recognized presidential immunity for official acts and remanded the case. Smith filed a superseding indictment that dropped certain official-act allegations. After Trump’s 2024 victory, Smith moved to dismiss, citing longstanding DOJ policy against prosecuting a sitting president. Judge Tanya Chutkan dismissed the case without prejudice in late 2024. The statute of limitations will expire before 2029. Classified-documents case (S.D. Fla.)
Attorney General Merrick Garland assigned Smith two preexisting investigations. Smith obtained grand-jury indictments in both; neither went to trial. He submitted a final report in January 2025 concluding the evidence met the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, then resigned. Volume 1 (election case) has been discussed publicly; Volume 2 (documents case) remains under a court injunction blocking release. Election-interference case (D.D.C.)
August 2023 indictment charged four felonies: conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding, obstruction of an official proceeding, and conspiracy against rights. Prosecutors alleged a scheme involving false fraud claims, fake electors, and pressure on Vice President Pence, state officials, and the Justice Department after the 2020 election. The Supreme Court in July 2024 recognized presidential immunity for official acts and remanded the case. Smith filed a superseding indictment that dropped certain official-act allegations. After Trump’s 2024 victory, Smith moved to dismiss, citing longstanding DOJ policy against prosecuting a sitting president. Judge Tanya Chutkan dismissed the case without prejudice in late 2024. The statute of limitations will expire before 2029. Classified-documents case (S.D. Fla.)
June 2023 indictment charged Trump (and later aides Walt Nauta and Carlos De Oliveira) with dozens of counts under the Espionage Act for willful retention of national-defense information, plus conspiracy to obstruct justice and false statements. Prosecutors alleged Trump kept hundreds of classified documents at Mar-a-Lago after leaving office and obstructed efforts by the National Archives and FBI to retrieve them. In July 2024 Judge Aileen Cannon dismissed the entire case, ruling Smith’s appointment as Special Counsel violated the Appointments Clause. Smith appealed. After the 2024 election the Justice Department dropped the appeal as to Trump and later as to the co-defendants; the Eleventh Circuit formally ended the remaining case in February 2025. Cannon later issued a permanent injunction blocking public release of Smith’s Volume 2 report, citing fairness and the presumption of innocence after dismissal; that ruling is on appeal.
Context of current scrutiny
Smith has testified that the investigations used standard tools (including toll records of congressional phone calls, not content) and that he would bring the same charges against a president of either party on the same facts. Republican senators have focused on the scope and timing of subpoenas, alleged Speech or Debate Clause issues, and an earlier “Arctic Frost” inquiry into members of Congress. Both cases ended without a jury verdict; legal disputes over the reports and appointment authority continue.
Smith has testified that the investigations used standard tools (including toll records of congressional phone calls, not content) and that he would bring the same charges against a president of either party on the same facts. Republican senators have focused on the scope and timing of subpoenas, alleged Speech or Debate Clause issues, and an earlier “Arctic Frost” inquiry into members of Congress. Both cases ended without a jury verdict; legal disputes over the reports and appointment authority continue.
Monday, September 28, 2026
President Trump sets the record STRAIGHT on ICE arrest policy.
- President Trump's recent clarification that ICE arrest policy remains unchanged, allowing enforcement against all illegal immigrants rather than limiting to those with criminal records.
- The statement addresses September 27, 2026 reports of internal guidance that briefly appeared to restrict non-criminal arrests and collateral detentions, prompting swift DHS denial and reaffirmation of broad authority.
- Data from Trump's second term shows ICE arrests have surged with a notable portion involving individuals lacking U.S. criminal convictions, underscoring the policy's focus on overall immigration violations beyond public safety threats alone.
ICE arrest numbers have risen sharply since early 2025, while the share of people taken into custody who already have a U.S. criminal conviction has fallen. The gap between official talking points and the underlying data is mostly about definitions and scale. Volume. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) made 113,431 administrative arrests in FY 2024. Independent analyses of FOIA data put interior arrests after January 20, 2025 at several times that pace: one peer-reviewed study of 1.6 million records found an average of about 952 arrests per day from January 2025 through March 2026, versus about 304 per day in the year before the second inauguration. DHS later reported monthly records of roughly 43,900 in June 2026, 50,208 in July, and 50,925 in August. Book-ins to ICE detention, a common proxy when arrest tables lag, reached about 365,500 in calendar 2025.
Criminal history. ICE groups people as convicted, pending U.S. charges, or “other immigration violators” (no known U.S. conviction or pending charge). In FY 2024, ICE said 71.7% of ERO administrative arrests had a conviction or pending charges; about 51% had an actual prior conviction. Under the later, higher-volume period, that conviction share dropped. USAFacts reported 38% with a prior conviction in 2025 and 32% in April 2026. The Deportation Data Project put the conviction share among book-ins at an all-time low of 27% in July 2026. A PNAS analysis found 34% with a conviction across the first 14 months of the second term, versus 52% in Biden’s last year and 70–79% in earlier high-priority periods. CBS, using an internal DHS document covering the first year back in office, reported that about 40% of ~393,000 arrests had no U.S. criminal record and that under 14% involved violent charges or convictions. How the numbers can both be “true.” DHS often cites “criminal aliens” as people with either convictions or pending charges, and sometimes treats illegal presence itself as the relevant offense. That produces figures near 60–70% “criminal.” Researchers who count only recorded U.S. convictions get closer to one-third. Among those who do have convictions, traffic, drug, and immigration offenses (illegal entry/re-entry) have long made up a large share; violent crimes are a smaller slice. Illegal presence is generally a civil violation; illegal re-entry after removal is a crime. Foreign convictions are often not in the U.S. files ICE publishes.
How people are arrested. The mix shifted toward at-large/community arrests and 287(g) partnerships with local police, not just jail transfers after someone has already been booked for a crime.
Community arrests rose from about 17% of the total in the year before the second term to nearly half in 2025–early 2026. When ICE expands street and collateral arrests, the pool of available convicted targets is finite, so the conviction rate falls even if the number of convicted people arrested also rises. That pattern showed up in both Trump terms, but more sharply in the second because the overall volume increase was larger. What this means for the policy fight. The administration’s legal position is that anyone unlawfully present is subject to arrest and removal. The data is consistent with that: a large and growing share of arrests are of people whose only recorded U.S. offense is an immigration violation. The same data does not support the narrower claim that most current arrests are of people already convicted of serious violent crimes. Both the surge in total arrests and the drop in the conviction share are large enough, and appear in official, FOIA, and academic sources, that they are not a rounding issue. Official ICE statistical dashboards have lagged the monthly press totals, so the most current criminality splits still come mainly from FOIA-processed datasets rather than a fully current ICE year-end report.
Criminal history. ICE groups people as convicted, pending U.S. charges, or “other immigration violators” (no known U.S. conviction or pending charge). In FY 2024, ICE said 71.7% of ERO administrative arrests had a conviction or pending charges; about 51% had an actual prior conviction. Under the later, higher-volume period, that conviction share dropped. USAFacts reported 38% with a prior conviction in 2025 and 32% in April 2026. The Deportation Data Project put the conviction share among book-ins at an all-time low of 27% in July 2026. A PNAS analysis found 34% with a conviction across the first 14 months of the second term, versus 52% in Biden’s last year and 70–79% in earlier high-priority periods. CBS, using an internal DHS document covering the first year back in office, reported that about 40% of ~393,000 arrests had no U.S. criminal record and that under 14% involved violent charges or convictions. How the numbers can both be “true.” DHS often cites “criminal aliens” as people with either convictions or pending charges, and sometimes treats illegal presence itself as the relevant offense. That produces figures near 60–70% “criminal.” Researchers who count only recorded U.S. convictions get closer to one-third. Among those who do have convictions, traffic, drug, and immigration offenses (illegal entry/re-entry) have long made up a large share; violent crimes are a smaller slice. Illegal presence is generally a civil violation; illegal re-entry after removal is a crime. Foreign convictions are often not in the U.S. files ICE publishes.
How people are arrested. The mix shifted toward at-large/community arrests and 287(g) partnerships with local police, not just jail transfers after someone has already been booked for a crime.
Community arrests rose from about 17% of the total in the year before the second term to nearly half in 2025–early 2026. When ICE expands street and collateral arrests, the pool of available convicted targets is finite, so the conviction rate falls even if the number of convicted people arrested also rises. That pattern showed up in both Trump terms, but more sharply in the second because the overall volume increase was larger. What this means for the policy fight. The administration’s legal position is that anyone unlawfully present is subject to arrest and removal. The data is consistent with that: a large and growing share of arrests are of people whose only recorded U.S. offense is an immigration violation. The same data does not support the narrower claim that most current arrests are of people already convicted of serious violent crimes. Both the surge in total arrests and the drop in the conviction share are large enough, and appear in official, FOIA, and academic sources, that they are not a rounding issue. Official ICE statistical dashboards have lagged the monthly press totals, so the most current criminality splits still come mainly from FOIA-processed datasets rather than a fully current ICE year-end report.
USA President Trump makes SURPRISING comparison as the AI debate intensifies.
- President Trump made a surprising comparison amid the intensifying AI debate, referring to his recent dismissal of AI existential risk warnings as a "hoax."
- Trump has equated concerns about AI leading to robots taking over or mass extinction with climate change alarmism and Russia collusion claims, arguing they are exaggerated to justify regulation and slow U.S. progress.
- His stance prioritizes accelerating AI development to maintain America's lead over China, viewing it as critical to economic growth and global supremacy rather than imposing slowdowns.
Trump's AI Policy
The Trump administration AI policy, as of September 2026, centers on accelerating U.S. development and deployment to maintain a lead over China while applying limited, mostly voluntary government oversight focused on cybersecurity rather than broad slowdowns or existential-risk guardrails. The core framing treats advanced AI as a strategic asset comparable to the Industrial Revolution or the internet, with potential to drive a large share of GDP.
Public statements repeatedly emphasize “Whoever wins AI, WINS!” and reject calls to pause or tightly regulate frontier models, arguing that such steps would cede ground to China. Warnings of rogue agents, autonomous hacking, or catastrophic outcomes have been described as a “hoax” on the same scale as earlier climate-change or Russia-collusion claims. Official documents and actions implement a lighter-touch approach than the rhetoric sometimes suggests. The July 2025 America’s AI Action Plan organized federal efforts around three pillars: accelerating innovation, building infrastructure (especially energy and data centers), and international diplomacy/security.
A March 2026 National Policy Framework called for federal preemption of certain state AI laws, child-safety tools, protections against AI-enabled censorship, and workforce development, while directing most issues to existing regulators rather than a new AI agency. In June 2026 two major instruments added structure. Executive Order 14409 created a voluntary 30-day pre-release review window for “covered frontier models” (those meeting classified cyber-capability thresholds set by the NSA), an AI cybersecurity clearinghouse for vulnerability sharing, and explicit language barring mandatory licensing or pre-clearance.
National Security Presidential Memorandum-11 directed faster adoption of commercial and open-source models across the military and intelligence community, multi-vendor sourcing, high-security compute facilities, and an updated policy on autonomy in weapons systems; it also rescinded a prior administration memorandum. In mid-September 2026 the president announced plans for an “AI Force” modeled on Space Force and a new high-IQ “AI Czar,” with the stated purpose of supporting industry growth while using existing criminal and civil tools against misuse. Details on organization, authorities, and funding remained unspecified. Separate reports noted targeted restrictions, such as limited public rollout of certain high-capability models to vetted partners and some export-control measures. The policy therefore combines accelerationist public messaging with incremental, industry-collaborative mechanisms aimed at cyber defense and national-security use. Supporters argue this preserves U.S. technological and economic advantages without repeating what they view as overly cautious prior-era constraints.
Critics, including some industry researchers and lawmakers from both parties, contend the voluntary framework and dismissal of broader risk scenarios leave insufficient independent testing or international coordination as capabilities advance and documented incidents of autonomous model behavior increase. Implementation of the Action Plan’s 100-plus recommendations remains uneven, with most activity still at the guidance, RFI, or procurement stage.
Public statements repeatedly emphasize “Whoever wins AI, WINS!” and reject calls to pause or tightly regulate frontier models, arguing that such steps would cede ground to China. Warnings of rogue agents, autonomous hacking, or catastrophic outcomes have been described as a “hoax” on the same scale as earlier climate-change or Russia-collusion claims. Official documents and actions implement a lighter-touch approach than the rhetoric sometimes suggests. The July 2025 America’s AI Action Plan organized federal efforts around three pillars: accelerating innovation, building infrastructure (especially energy and data centers), and international diplomacy/security.
A March 2026 National Policy Framework called for federal preemption of certain state AI laws, child-safety tools, protections against AI-enabled censorship, and workforce development, while directing most issues to existing regulators rather than a new AI agency. In June 2026 two major instruments added structure. Executive Order 14409 created a voluntary 30-day pre-release review window for “covered frontier models” (those meeting classified cyber-capability thresholds set by the NSA), an AI cybersecurity clearinghouse for vulnerability sharing, and explicit language barring mandatory licensing or pre-clearance.
National Security Presidential Memorandum-11 directed faster adoption of commercial and open-source models across the military and intelligence community, multi-vendor sourcing, high-security compute facilities, and an updated policy on autonomy in weapons systems; it also rescinded a prior administration memorandum. In mid-September 2026 the president announced plans for an “AI Force” modeled on Space Force and a new high-IQ “AI Czar,” with the stated purpose of supporting industry growth while using existing criminal and civil tools against misuse. Details on organization, authorities, and funding remained unspecified. Separate reports noted targeted restrictions, such as limited public rollout of certain high-capability models to vetted partners and some export-control measures. The policy therefore combines accelerationist public messaging with incremental, industry-collaborative mechanisms aimed at cyber defense and national-security use. Supporters argue this preserves U.S. technological and economic advantages without repeating what they view as overly cautious prior-era constraints.
Critics, including some industry researchers and lawmakers from both parties, contend the voluntary framework and dismissal of broader risk scenarios leave insufficient independent testing or international coordination as capabilities advance and documented incidents of autonomous model behavior increase. Implementation of the Action Plan’s 100-plus recommendations remains uneven, with most activity still at the guidance, RFI, or procurement stage.
Nobody taking away our right to vote, wake up black people, he's talking about illegal migrants, they don't have ID, that's their new voting base.
This woman wins the internet today 🔥
— @Chicago1Ray 🇺🇸 (@Chicago1Ray) February 6, 2026
This is where my righteous anger pops up, bc know what he saying is a lie bc I live in the south and when I go to vote, every single time there's an election, and guess what, I show my ID, I write my signature, they check to see who I am… pic.twitter.com/g1iIWTQu4a
This is where my righteous anger pops up, bc know what he saying is a lie bc I live in the south and when I go to vote, every single time there's an election, and guess what, I show my ID, I write my signature, they check to see who I am. Nobody asking me to count any jellybeans in the jar, and quit lumping us in the people of color category. Nobody taking away our right to vote, wake up black people, he's talking about illegal migrants, they don't have ID, that's their new voting base. I've been having ID since I was 15 years old, I'm 50 years old, every black person i know has ID. You need an ID to buy liquor, cigarettes, get on a plane, go to a club, even the homeless guy i just gave $5 dollars had an ID to go get his liquor. Wait till the end when she talks about her marriage license... this lady nails it.
People from all over the World, like to read and watch GotoTom and GotoTom2
.https://t.co/6KxcqsvItX https://t.co/A5oTSK2g0O
— MAGAaTom -🇺🇸 🇺🇸- President Trump is Fantastic (@MAGAaTom) November 23, 2025
This chart shows which countries view my Blogs.
I like it that people all over the world read and watch my content.
I just wish that I was NOT CENSORED pic.twitter.com/9BvaxxuaGm
Sunday, September 27, 2026
NEW DETAILS: USA President Trump CONFRONTED Xi over China's assistance to Iran.
- President Trump did confront Xi Jinping over China's alleged assistance to Iran during their recent White House meeting.
- US Ambassador David Perdue stated Trump reiterated that any direct or indirect Chinese support—including intelligence, parts, or military equipment—is "totally unacceptable," with Beijing providing assurances it would stop.
- Reports indicate the warning follows allegations of China supplying Iran air-defense launchers, satellite imagery linked to attacks on US forces, and continuing oil purchases despite sanctions.
China's Strategic Calculus
China treats Iran as a useful but secondary, transactional partner rather than a true ally. Its approach combines energy access, limited deniable support, and public calls for talks while carefully avoiding steps that would trigger a direct clash with the United States. Energy remains the core interest.
China has long purchased the large majority of Iran’s seaborne oil—historically around 80–90 percent, or roughly 1.4 million barrels per day before the 2026 war—often at a discount and through barter arrangements, shadow fleets, and independent “teapot” refineries that sidestep the dollar system. This provides cheap crude and revenue that helps keep the Iranian government functioning. The U.S. naval blockade and sanctions have already cut those volumes sharply, and China has absorbed the disruption by drawing on inventories, Russian supplies, and other sources. Beijing therefore has no interest in a complete Iranian collapse that would eliminate this discounted stream, but it also has no interest in an open-ended war that keeps the Strait of Hormuz closed or drives prices higher.
Geopolitically, China benefits when the United States is occupied in the Middle East rather than focused on the Indo-Pacific. Limited Chinese-origin dual-use components, commercial satellite imagery, and occasional systems such as man-portable air-defense launchers raise the cost of U.S. and Israeli operations without requiring Beijing to send its own forces. Reports that Chinese entities supplied high-resolution imagery of a Jordanian air base before a July 2026 strike that killed three U.S. troops illustrate the pattern: useful to Tehran, deniable for Beijing, and still below the threshold of overt military intervention.
At the same time, China’s far larger trade and investment ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf states constrain how far it will go. An Iranian “victory” that leaves Hormuz under Tehran’s effective control, or a total Iranian defeat that produces a U.S.-aligned successor government, would both damage Chinese interests.The result is calibrated restraint. China issues statements condemning the use of force, proposes cease-fire frameworks, and urges a return to negotiations, while privately continuing oil purchases and selected commercial or dual-use flows.
When President Trump raised the issue directly with Xi Jinping in September 2026, U.S. officials said Beijing gave assurances it would stop the most problematic assistance. Iranian officials, however, claimed China privately promised not to cut economic or other ties under U.S. pressure. Both statements can be true: China can throttle the most visible or high-risk channels while preserving the underlying oil-for-goods relationship that matters most to it. The overriding constraint is the U.S.–China relationship itself. Trade, technology access, and Taiwan all rank higher than Iran. Beijing will therefore continue to treat Tehran as a hedge and a source of cheap energy, not as a partner worth sacrificing those larger priorities for. Its preferred outcome is a contained, negotiated end to the fighting that keeps Iran intact and dependent, the strait open, and Washington’s attention divided—without forcing China to choose sides in a way that invites secondary sanctions or a broader rupture.
China has long purchased the large majority of Iran’s seaborne oil—historically around 80–90 percent, or roughly 1.4 million barrels per day before the 2026 war—often at a discount and through barter arrangements, shadow fleets, and independent “teapot” refineries that sidestep the dollar system. This provides cheap crude and revenue that helps keep the Iranian government functioning. The U.S. naval blockade and sanctions have already cut those volumes sharply, and China has absorbed the disruption by drawing on inventories, Russian supplies, and other sources. Beijing therefore has no interest in a complete Iranian collapse that would eliminate this discounted stream, but it also has no interest in an open-ended war that keeps the Strait of Hormuz closed or drives prices higher.
Geopolitically, China benefits when the United States is occupied in the Middle East rather than focused on the Indo-Pacific. Limited Chinese-origin dual-use components, commercial satellite imagery, and occasional systems such as man-portable air-defense launchers raise the cost of U.S. and Israeli operations without requiring Beijing to send its own forces. Reports that Chinese entities supplied high-resolution imagery of a Jordanian air base before a July 2026 strike that killed three U.S. troops illustrate the pattern: useful to Tehran, deniable for Beijing, and still below the threshold of overt military intervention.
At the same time, China’s far larger trade and investment ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf states constrain how far it will go. An Iranian “victory” that leaves Hormuz under Tehran’s effective control, or a total Iranian defeat that produces a U.S.-aligned successor government, would both damage Chinese interests.The result is calibrated restraint. China issues statements condemning the use of force, proposes cease-fire frameworks, and urges a return to negotiations, while privately continuing oil purchases and selected commercial or dual-use flows.
When President Trump raised the issue directly with Xi Jinping in September 2026, U.S. officials said Beijing gave assurances it would stop the most problematic assistance. Iranian officials, however, claimed China privately promised not to cut economic or other ties under U.S. pressure. Both statements can be true: China can throttle the most visible or high-risk channels while preserving the underlying oil-for-goods relationship that matters most to it. The overriding constraint is the U.S.–China relationship itself. Trade, technology access, and Taiwan all rank higher than Iran. Beijing will therefore continue to treat Tehran as a hedge and a source of cheap energy, not as a partner worth sacrificing those larger priorities for. Its preferred outcome is a contained, negotiated end to the fighting that keeps Iran intact and dependent, the strait open, and Washington’s attention divided—without forcing China to choose sides in a way that invites secondary sanctions or a broader rupture.
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