Monday, September 28, 2026

President Trump sets the record STRAIGHT on ICE arrest policy.

  • President Trump's recent clarification that ICE arrest policy remains unchanged, allowing enforcement against all illegal immigrants rather than limiting to those with criminal records.
  • The statement addresses September 27, 2026 reports of internal guidance that briefly appeared to restrict non-criminal arrests and collateral detentions, prompting swift DHS denial and reaffirmation of broad authority.
  • Data from Trump's second term shows ICE arrests have surged with a notable portion involving individuals lacking U.S. criminal convictions, underscoring the policy's focus on overall immigration violations beyond public safety threats alone.

ICE arrest numbers have risen sharply since early 2025, while the share of people taken into custody who already have a U.S. criminal conviction has fallen. The gap between official talking points and the underlying data is mostly about definitions and scale. Volume. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) made 113,431 administrative arrests in FY 2024. Independent analyses of FOIA data put interior arrests after January 20, 2025 at several times that pace: one peer-reviewed study of 1.6 million records found an average of about 952 arrests per day from January 2025 through March 2026, versus about 304 per day in the year before the second inauguration. DHS later reported monthly records of roughly 43,900 in June 2026, 50,208 in July, and 50,925 in August. Book-ins to ICE detention, a common proxy when arrest tables lag, reached about 365,500 in calendar 2025. 
Criminal history. ICE groups people as convicted, pending U.S. charges, or “other immigration violators” (no known U.S. conviction or pending charge). In FY 2024, ICE said 71.7% of ERO administrative arrests had a conviction or pending charges; about 51% had an actual prior conviction. Under the later, higher-volume period, that conviction share dropped. USAFacts reported 38% with a prior conviction in 2025 and 32% in April 2026. The Deportation Data Project put the conviction share among book-ins at an all-time low of 27% in July 2026. A PNAS analysis found 34% with a conviction across the first 14 months of the second term, versus 52% in Biden’s last year and 70–79% in earlier high-priority periods. CBS, using an internal DHS document covering the first year back in office, reported that about 40% of ~393,000 arrests had no U.S. criminal record and that under 14% involved violent charges or convictions. How the numbers can both be “true.” DHS often cites “criminal aliens” as people with either convictions or pending charges, and sometimes treats illegal presence itself as the relevant offense. That produces figures near 60–70% “criminal.” Researchers who count only recorded U.S. convictions get closer to one-third. Among those who do have convictions, traffic, drug, and immigration offenses (illegal entry/re-entry) have long made up a large share; violent crimes are a smaller slice. Illegal presence is generally a civil violation; illegal re-entry after removal is a crime. Foreign convictions are often not in the U.S. files ICE publishes. 
How people are arrested. The mix shifted toward at-large/community arrests and 287(g) partnerships with local police, not just jail transfers after someone has already been booked for a crime. 
Community arrests rose from about 17% of the total in the year before the second term to nearly half in 2025–early 2026. When ICE expands street and collateral arrests, the pool of available convicted targets is finite, so the conviction rate falls even if the number of convicted people arrested also rises. That pattern showed up in both Trump terms, but more sharply in the second because the overall volume increase was larger. What this means for the policy fight. The administration’s legal position is that anyone unlawfully present is subject to arrest and removal. The data is consistent with that: a large and growing share of arrests are of people whose only recorded U.S. offense is an immigration violation. The same data does not support the narrower claim that most current arrests are of people already convicted of serious violent crimes. Both the surge in total arrests and the drop in the conviction share are large enough, and appear in official, FOIA, and academic sources, that they are not a rounding issue. Official ICE statistical dashboards have lagged the monthly press totals, so the most current criminality splits still come mainly from FOIA-processed datasets rather than a fully current ICE year-end report.

USA President Trump makes SURPRISING comparison as the AI debate intensifies.

  • President Trump made a surprising comparison amid the intensifying AI debate, referring to his recent dismissal of AI existential risk warnings as a "hoax."
  • Trump has equated concerns about AI leading to robots taking over or mass extinction with climate change alarmism and Russia collusion claims, arguing they are exaggerated to justify regulation and slow U.S. progress.
  • His stance prioritizes accelerating AI development to maintain America's lead over China, viewing it as critical to economic growth and global supremacy rather than imposing slowdowns.

Trump's AI Policy
The Trump administration AI policy, as of September 2026, centers on accelerating U.S. development and deployment to maintain a lead over China while applying limited, mostly voluntary government oversight focused on cybersecurity rather than broad slowdowns or existential-risk guardrails. The core framing treats advanced AI as a strategic asset comparable to the Industrial Revolution or the internet, with potential to drive a large share of GDP. 
Public statements repeatedly emphasize “Whoever wins AI, WINS!” and reject calls to pause or tightly regulate frontier models, arguing that such steps would cede ground to China. Warnings of rogue agents, autonomous hacking, or catastrophic outcomes have been described as a “hoax” on the same scale as earlier climate-change or Russia-collusion claims. Official documents and actions implement a lighter-touch approach than the rhetoric sometimes suggests. The July 2025 America’s AI Action Plan organized federal efforts around three pillars: accelerating innovation, building infrastructure (especially energy and data centers), and international diplomacy/security. 
A March 2026 National Policy Framework called for federal preemption of certain state AI laws, child-safety tools, protections against AI-enabled censorship, and workforce development, while directing most issues to existing regulators rather than a new AI agency. In June 2026 two major instruments added structure. Executive Order 14409 created a voluntary 30-day pre-release review window for “covered frontier models” (those meeting classified cyber-capability thresholds set by the NSA), an AI cybersecurity clearinghouse for vulnerability sharing, and explicit language barring mandatory licensing or pre-clearance. 
National Security Presidential Memorandum-11 directed faster adoption of commercial and open-source models across the military and intelligence community, multi-vendor sourcing, high-security compute facilities, and an updated policy on autonomy in weapons systems; it also rescinded a prior administration memorandum. In mid-September 2026 the president announced plans for an “AI Force” modeled on Space Force and a new high-IQ “AI Czar,” with the stated purpose of supporting industry growth while using existing criminal and civil tools against misuse. Details on organization, authorities, and funding remained unspecified. Separate reports noted targeted restrictions, such as limited public rollout of certain high-capability models to vetted partners and some export-control measures. The policy therefore combines accelerationist public messaging with incremental, industry-collaborative mechanisms aimed at cyber defense and national-security use. Supporters argue this preserves U.S. technological and economic advantages without repeating what they view as overly cautious prior-era constraints. 
Critics, including some industry researchers and lawmakers from both parties, contend the voluntary framework and dismissal of broader risk scenarios leave insufficient independent testing or international coordination as capabilities advance and documented incidents of autonomous model behavior increase. Implementation of the Action Plan’s 100-plus recommendations remains uneven, with most activity still at the guidance, RFI, or procurement stage.

 

Nobody taking away our right to vote, wake up black people, he's talking about illegal migrants, they don't have ID, that's their new voting base.

 



This is where my righteous anger pops up, bc know what he saying is a lie bc I live in the south and when I go to vote, every single time there's an election, and guess what, I show my ID, I write my signature, they check to see who I am. Nobody asking me to count any jellybeans in the jar, and quit lumping us in the people of color category. Nobody taking away our right to vote, wake up black people, he's talking about illegal migrants, they don't have ID, that's their new voting base. I've been having ID since I was 15 years old, I'm 50 years old, every black person i know has ID. You need an ID to buy liquor, cigarettes, get on a plane, go to a club, even the homeless guy i just gave $5 dollars had an ID to go get his liquor. Wait till the end when she talks about her marriage license... this lady nails it.

People from all over the World, like to read and watch GotoTom and GotoTom2

 



Sunday, September 27, 2026

NEW DETAILS: USA President Trump CONFRONTED Xi over China's assistance to Iran.

  • President Trump did confront Xi Jinping over China's alleged assistance to Iran during their recent White House meeting.
  • US Ambassador David Perdue stated Trump reiterated that any direct or indirect Chinese support—including intelligence, parts, or military equipment—is "totally unacceptable," with Beijing providing assurances it would stop.
  • Reports indicate the warning follows allegations of China supplying Iran air-defense launchers, satellite imagery linked to attacks on US forces, and continuing oil purchases despite sanctions.

China's Strategic Calculus
China treats Iran as a useful but secondary, transactional partner rather than a true ally. Its approach combines energy access, limited deniable support, and public calls for talks while carefully avoiding steps that would trigger a direct clash with the United States. Energy remains the core interest. 
China has long purchased the large majority of Iran’s seaborne oil—historically around 80–90 percent, or roughly 1.4 million barrels per day before the 2026 war—often at a discount and through barter arrangements, shadow fleets, and independent “teapot” refineries that sidestep the dollar system. This provides cheap crude and revenue that helps keep the Iranian government functioning. The U.S. naval blockade and sanctions have already cut those volumes sharply, and China has absorbed the disruption by drawing on inventories, Russian supplies, and other sources. Beijing therefore has no interest in a complete Iranian collapse that would eliminate this discounted stream, but it also has no interest in an open-ended war that keeps the Strait of Hormuz closed or drives prices higher. 
Geopolitically, China benefits when the United States is occupied in the Middle East rather than focused on the Indo-Pacific. Limited Chinese-origin dual-use components, commercial satellite imagery, and occasional systems such as man-portable air-defense launchers raise the cost of U.S. and Israeli operations without requiring Beijing to send its own forces. Reports that Chinese entities supplied high-resolution imagery of a Jordanian air base before a July 2026 strike that killed three U.S. troops illustrate the pattern: useful to Tehran, deniable for Beijing, and still below the threshold of overt military intervention. 
At the same time, China’s far larger trade and investment ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf states constrain how far it will go. An Iranian “victory” that leaves Hormuz under Tehran’s effective control, or a total Iranian defeat that produces a U.S.-aligned successor government, would both damage Chinese interests.The result is calibrated restraint. China issues statements condemning the use of force, proposes cease-fire frameworks, and urges a return to negotiations, while privately continuing oil purchases and selected commercial or dual-use flows. 
When President Trump raised the issue directly with Xi Jinping in September 2026, U.S. officials said Beijing gave assurances it would stop the most problematic assistance. Iranian officials, however, claimed China privately promised not to cut economic or other ties under U.S. pressure. Both statements can be true: China can throttle the most visible or high-risk channels while preserving the underlying oil-for-goods relationship that matters most to it. The overriding constraint is the U.S.–China relationship itself. Trade, technology access, and Taiwan all rank higher than Iran. Beijing will therefore continue to treat Tehran as a hedge and a source of cheap energy, not as a partner worth sacrificing those larger priorities for. Its preferred outcome is a contained, negotiated end to the fighting that keeps Iran intact and dependent, the strait open, and Washington’s attention divided—without forcing China to choose sides in a way that invites secondary sanctions or a broader rupture.

I just BUSTED evil Google / YouTube again unfairly censoring my comments and content. They are doing this to many Republicans and Conservatives.


 x.com/SaraJonesUSA/status/2095823427471081784?s=20






Below see the screen shot with my comment missing. 
I think that Google / YouTube is unfairly censoring Republicans and Conversatives. It is a form of illegal election interference. 
Evil Google wants to control what you think, far left Communist Democrats are NEVER censored like I am.






Saturday, September 26, 2026

Monster nor’easter SLAMS Rhode Island, threatens widespread outages.

  • A "monster nor’easter" hitting Rhode Island and threatening widespread power outages, linking to a blog post on the developing storm.
  • Reliable forecasts and reports confirm the September 2026 nor’easter is delivering 3-6 inches of rain, wind gusts of 45-60 mph, and coastal flooding across Rhode Island and southern New England.
  • The storm has already caused tens of thousands of power outages in the region, with a full moon amplifying high tides and flooding risks in low-lying coastal areas.
  • USA President Trump using his important 'BARGAINING CHIP' with China on Taiwan.

    • President Trump's use of a pending $14 billion US arms package for Taiwan as a key "bargaining chip" in negotiations with China.
    • Trump has delayed approval of the arms sale package, publicly called it a "very good negotiating chip," and discussed it directly with Xi Jinping in 2026 summits in Beijing and Washington.
    • The strategy reflects Trump's transactional foreign policy aiming for Chinese concessions on trade and purchases, amid ongoing US-China talks on Taiwan and economic issues.

    BREAKING: USA President Trump reportedly REJECTS Iran's ceasefire proposal.

    Global oil markets remain tight in late September 2026, driven by persistent Middle East supply disruptions rather than demand strength. Benchmark prices have stayed elevated after a volatile year, with ICE Brent futures settling near $104–105 per barrel and WTI around $92, producing a wide ~$12 spread that reflects Atlantic Basin tightness versus more available U.S. barrels. The IEA’s September Oil Market Report, released around the same time as recent price action, projects a 2.5 million barrel per day (mb/d) drop in world oil demand for 2026—steeper than prior estimates—concentrated in middle distillates and petrochemical feedstocks, especially in Asia. 

    Global supply is forecast to fall 5.7 mb/d to 100.7 mb/d this year, with more than 10 mb/d of Gulf output still shut in as of August. Full Gulf recovery is now deferred to 2027, when supply is expected to rebound by about 8 mb/d. Inventories have absorbed much of the imbalance so far. Observed global stocks drew 95 million barrels in August alone and 507 million barrels (average 2.8 mb/d) since February. OECD commercial stocks have been supported by government releases, but overall buffers are shrinking and product markets—particularly diesel—are far tighter than crude, with U.S. diesel/gasoil prices exceeding $200 per barrel at points in early September. Refinery runs remain well below year-ago levels. 

    The U.S.-Iran impasse, constrained Strait of Hormuz flows, and related attacks have kept Gulf crude and product exports well below pre-conflict levels (roughly half for crude in August). OPEC+ held October production targets unchanged after completing a phased unwind of earlier cuts, but actual output from core members remains far below quotas because of security risks and shipping constraints. Non-OPEC+ growth, led by the Americas, is providing some offset but cannot fully replace lost Middle East barrels in the near term. 

    The EIA’s latest Short-Term Energy Outlook is somewhat less bearish on 2026 balances than the IEA, forecasting Brent averaging about $91 for the year and $90 in the second half before declining to $74 in 2027 as production recovers and inventories rebuild. Both agencies see 2026 as a deficit year and 2027 as a surplus year once flows normalize. 

    Near-term risks remain skewed to the upside on prices if Hormuz disruptions intensify or negotiations stay stalled. Downside risks include further demand destruction from high fuel costs, faster-than-expected Gulf recovery, or weaker Chinese/Asian consumption. Markets are currently pricing a prolonged disruption scenario with limited spare capacity and thin product inventories. 


    Friday, September 25, 2026

    Retired 4 Star General Jack Keane joined 'Fox & Friends' to discuss what he calls the 'false narrative' suggesting that Israel has committed genocide as Netanyahu vows to keep defending the Jewish state.

    Retired four-star General Jack Keane completed an 11-day tour of Israel that ended around September 21, 2026. He met senior political and military officials and traveled into Gaza and Lebanon with IDF units. During the Gaza portion he entered sections of Hamas’s tunnel network, which he described as totaling about 400 miles beneath a small territory. 

    He said command posts, logistics routes, and fighting positions sat under hospitals, schools, and mosques, and that he spoke directly with Israeli commanders on the ground who were systematically destroying those tunnels. Keane reported that a ceasefire framework in place since October 2025 had not ended Hamas activity. 

    He said the group was regenerating thousands of fighters (one appearance cited a figure of 10,000 new recruits) and still using the remaining tunnels to sustain operations, while Israel maintained a multi-mile buffer zone inside Gaza. 

    These on-site observations formed the basis of his later public argument that Israeli strikes targeted military infrastructure rather than civilians.