Friday, November 20, 2026

Former acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf discusses judges' rulings blocking efforts to unmask ICE agents in California and Connecticut.

ICE Agents need to wear masks to protect the ICE agents and their families.


 

President Donald Trump answers Fox News White House correspondent Aishah Hasnie’s questions about the FAA ground stop, technology outages and efforts to modernize air traffic control.



FAA air traffic control modernization has two main eras: the long-running NextGen program and the accelerated Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS/“Modern Skies”) effort launched in 2025.NextGen (roughly 2003–2025)
  • 2003–2004: Vision 100 Act creates the Joint Planning and Development Office; DOT releases the Integrated Plan for the Next Generation Air Transportation System. 
  • 2007–2010s: Concept of Operations; early Performance-Based Navigation routes; ADS-B ground infrastructure largely complete by ~2014; En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) fully deployed at all 20 en-route centers by 2015; Data Comm tower services finished at planned airports by 2016. 
  • 2019–2020: ADS-B becomes operational nationwide (ahead of the 2020 equipage mandate); further Data Comm and information-sharing advances via SWIM. 
  • 2021: Nationwide Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) rollout complete, replacing older terminal radar systems and incorporating ADS-B. 
  • 2024–2025: Data Comm en-route services reach continuous operation across all 20 Air Route Traffic Control Centers. The NextGen office closes at the end of 2025 under the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, with responsibilities shifting to a new modernization office. ADS-B and related systems are described as mature in most controlled airspace. 
NextGen improved navigation, surveillance, and digital communications but faced delays, mixed milestone achievement, and criticism that only a modest share of projected benefits had been realized by the mid-2020s. Core legacy infrastructure (especially telecommunications) remained largely intact. Brand New Air Traffic Control System / Modern Skies (2025–present)
  • May 2025: Initiative launched to replace outdated radar, software, hardware, and telecommunications on an accelerated schedule, distinct from (but building on) NextGen. 
  • July 2025: Congress appropriates $12.5 billion (via the One Big Beautiful Bill Act) primarily for Phase 1 systems modernization. 
  • Late 2025: Peraton selected as prime integrator; workstreams organized around communications (copper-to-fiber and IP), surveillance (new radars), automation (electronic flight strips / TFDM), facilities, Alaska-specific systems, and training. 
  • Target: Phase 1 complete by December 2028. This pulls forward multiple prior schedules (e.g., voice radio replacements by roughly nine years). Goals include ~5,170 new high-speed connections, ~27,000+ new radios, 450 digital voice switches, 612 new radars, electronic flight strips at 89 airports, and related upgrades across ~4,600 sites. 
  • Progress as of mid-November 2026 (FAA Modern Skies data): ~71% of telecommunications replaced (3,651 of 5,170), ~51% of IP voice switches installed, ~31% of radio sites converted and electronic flight strips implemented, with radar deployment still early (~3%). Copper-to-fiber work on the legacy FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) network (handled by L3Harris and partners) was already well advanced and was the context for the November 13, 2026 nationwide ground stop. 
Phase 2 (deeper automation and traffic optimization) has later or still-developing timelines and higher cost estimates. GAO reviews have noted the ambitious speed of BNATCS and called for stronger cost and schedule planning. The November 2026 outage occurred during ongoing sustainment/upgrade work on aging copper-based systems that the 2025–2028 effort is intended to fully replace. Official FAA pages (faa.gov/nextgen and faa.gov/new-atcs) are the primary sources for program status.

Retired four-star Gen. Jack Keane casts doubt on claims that Russia would accept NATO-like security guarantees for Ukraine, warning that Vladimir Putin is only creating the illusion of wanting a deal to extract concessions.

Vladimir Putin is a War Criminal.

General Jack Keane (retired U.S. Army four-star, former Vice Chief of Staff, chairman of the Institute for the Study of War, and frequent strategic analyst) has consistently argued that Ukraine can prevent Russian victory and generate leverage for a favorable outcome if the West supplies the right capabilities without self-imposed restrictions.

Battlefield assessment

Keane maintains that Russia’s conventional forces struggle with effective combined-arms operations and have achieved only marginal territorial gains at extremely high cost (often cited in the range of tens of thousands of casualties per month in peak periods). He has described Russia as largely stalemated offensively for extended periods, unable to seize the full “fortress belt” or broader Ukrainian territory if Western support continues. Putin, in his view, cannot defeat Ukraine’s army on the battlefield and therefore shifts to attritional strikes on civilians and infrastructure to break Ukrainian will and political resolve.

Recommended military approach for Ukraine

Keane has advocated equipping Ukraine for sustained pressure rather than a single decisive breakthrough:

  • Integration of Western systems (tanks, armored vehicles, advanced artillery, air defense such as Patriots, long-range missiles like ATACMS, and aircraft) with Ukrainian-produced drones and systems.
  • Sequential smaller counteroffensives that exploit technological advantages and pin Russian forces across a wide front (“stretch, starve, and strike”), rather than concentrating everything on one axis.
  • Lifting restrictions on strikes against legitimate Russian military targets inside Russia (airbases, logistics, depots) to deny sanctuary.
  • Earlier proposals included operations to threaten or sever the land bridge to Crimea and degrade Russian logistics there.

He has framed this as enabling Ukraine to stop Russian advances, regain momentum, and create leverage, while warning that a full Russian victory would strengthen Putin, bring forces closer to NATO borders, and encourage a China-Russia-Iran-North Korea axis.

Diplomacy, security guarantees, and Putin

This is the core of the view highlighted in the blog post linked on X. Keane has repeatedly cast doubt on the sincerity of Russian interest in a durable deal. He argues Putin creates the appearance of openness to negotiations primarily to extract concessions (territorial, economic, or political) while continuing the war, pointing to Russia’s record of violating prior ceasefires and Putin’s unchanged maximalist goals (control or influence over Ukraine as a platform against Europe and NATO).

He emphasizes that credible security guarantees—with real deterrent “teeth” (e.g., ready air power, forces that would respond to violations, and longevity beyond any single administration)—are essential. Strong guarantees, in his analysis, give Ukraine more flexibility on territorial questions; weak ones make concessions risky. He has supported negotiating when it serves Ukraine’s interests and when pressure is high, but has also argued for walking away or intensifying military/economic pressure if Putin refuses basic steps such as an unconditional ceasefire.

Context and limitations

Keane’s views draw on his experience with the 2007 Iraq Surge and long-term study of the conflict through ISW. They have been consistent across administrations in prioritizing sustained Western support and skepticism of Russian commitments. Critics have noted his past affiliations with defense industry boards and that some earlier optimistic timelines for Ukrainian breakthroughs proved protracted in an attritional war. His analysis treats all Wars as a test of will in which military capacity and credible deterrence shape negotiating leverage more than goodwill.

Elon Musk on Why the Future Should Make You Glad to Be Alive | TomorrowX Summit.

Elon Musk’s appearance at the TomorrowX Summit (November 17–18, 2026, Austin) was a remote video conversation from Shenzhen with longtime associates Gavin Baker and Antonio Gracias. It was informal and technical rather than a prepared keynote, covering Starship progress, xAI/Grok, Optimus, Neuralink, compute scaling, orbital concepts, and AI safety.

Major technical updates and claims
Musk highlighted Starship’s first upper-stage ship catch (Flight 15, Ship 42) as completing the proof that every major element can reach space and return in reusable condition (building on prior booster catches). He projected that full, rapid reusability could cut the cost of access to space by roughly 100× (with further gains possible), enabling million-ton-per-year mass-to-orbit rates and the industrial base needed for Moon/Mars settlement. The historic ship itself will be preserved for display rather than reflown.

On xAI, he described a ground-up rebuild of the training, RL, and inference stack in C/C++ (abandoning JAX/SGLang), driven by former Starlink and Starship engineers after an earlier phase of relative neglect. Grok 4.8 is being tuned for real usefulness over benchmark chasing. Compute capacity is currently growing at about 0.5 GW per month, with a target above 1 GW per month by the end of 2027, at claimed costs around 60% of broader industry estimates, aided by in-house “Army X” crews and Tesla Megapacks for power smoothing. He also sketched orbital AI compute (Starmind) as simpler in key respects than Starlink V3 satellites and dependent on Starship cadence for large-scale space photovoltaic capacity.

Optimus timelines were concrete: authentic demos soon, household chores (e.g., dishwashing and put-away) in 12–18 months, with early real work in heavy industry (mining/refining) running near-continuously. Neuralink has more than 30 human implants; Telepathy aims to restore mobility for the paralyzed, with Blindsight as the next vision product. Additional notes covered careful Cybercab rollout and Terafab’s first test chip around mid-2027, with initial mass production targeted by the end of 2028.

Framing and AI safety
Musk returned to a longstanding theme: multi-planetary civilization as both practical insurance for consciousness/biosphere backup and an inspirational goal that gives people something positive to look forward to. He stated that life cannot be only “one miserable problem after another” and that “any self-respecting civilization has got to be a multiplanet civilization.”

On AI safety, he argued that the single most important property is maximal truth-seeking. Forcing politically convenient falsehoods forces reasoning from lies and risks worse outcomes; he referenced the idea that those who believe absurdities can commit atrocities. A curious, truth-seeking superintelligence, in his view, would more likely treat humanity as something to study and preserve rather than eliminate.

He also expressed strong admiration for China’s scale and technology (especially Shenzhen), thanked the Tesla Shanghai team, and expressed hope for stable long-term U.S.–China relations while noting potential near-term geopolitical friction.

Overall assessment
The session was classic Musk: high-ambition, first-principles, milestone-focused, and explicitly optimistic about technological abundance as a reason to be glad to be alive. The claims are checkable in principle (ship catch already demonstrated; compute and robot timelines are aggressive but consistent with his historical pattern of setting high bars and iterating). Execution risk remains high across Starship cadence, robot hardware (especially hands), custom AI stack performance, and power/networking buildouts. The truth-seeking emphasis on AI is a clear continuation of his long-standing safety argument and contrasts with approaches that prioritize other constraints. Full video is available on YouTube for anyone wanting the unfiltered ~55-minute conversation.

The USA Government has Failed to give Americans "Online Freedom of Speech".

 


Please click here, and read the content that evil Google does not want you to see. 

Thursday, November 19, 2026

JUST IN: President Trump meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

  • USA President Trump meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping.
  • The meeting is occurring at the APEC summit in Shenzhen, China, on November 18-19, 2026, marking their third face-to-face encounter this year, with Xi personally greeting Trump at the airport and leaders posing for group photos alongside Putin.
  • Discussions have covered trade tariffs, fentanyl reductions, energy security in the Strait of Hormuz, and preventing Iranian nuclear weapons, as confirmed by multiple outlets including ABC News, USA Today, and NBC.
  •  

    Wednesday, November 18, 2026

    'BREAKING CHINESE PROTOCOL': China Xi does something 'EXTRA' while greeting USA President Trump.


    BREAKING: USA President Trump greeted by Xi ahead of HIGH-STAKES China summit.


    USA-China diplomatic history spans trade and limited contact in the 19th–early 20th centuries, Cold War hostility after 1949, a dramatic opening in the 1970s, decades of economic engagement, and intensifying strategic competition in the 21st century.

    Early Contacts to World War II (1784–1949)

    US trade with China began in 1784 with the voyage of the Empress of China. Formal diplomatic ties date to the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia (Wanghia), which gave the US most-favored-nation status and extraterritorial rights similar to those of European powers after the Opium Wars.

    The late-19th-century Open Door Policy (John Hay’s notes, 1899–1900) sought equal commercial access and preservation of China’s territorial integrity amid spheres of influence by European powers and Japan. The US supported China against Japanese aggression in the 1930s–1940s; wartime alliance with the Nationalist government (Republic of China/ROC) was important, though relations were complicated by Chinese internal politics and the US focus on defeating Japan and containing communism.

    Containment and Non-Recognition (1949–1971)

    The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949 after the Chinese Civil War. The US recognized the ROC (which relocated to Taiwan) as the legitimate government of China and refused to recognize the PRC for more than two decades. The Korean War (1950–53) brought direct military confrontation between US-led UN forces and Chinese “volunteer” troops. Subsequent Taiwan Strait crises (1950s), the PRC’s 1964 atomic test, and the Vietnam War kept relations deeply hostile. The US maintained a defense commitment to Taiwan and blocked the PRC from the UN until 1971.

    Rapprochement and Normalization (1971–1979)

    Shared strategic interest in countering the Soviet Union drove the opening. “Ping-Pong diplomacy” in 1971, Henry Kissinger’s secret trip, and President Richard Nixon’s February 1972 visit produced the Shanghai Communiqué. In it, the US acknowledged that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait held there was one China and that Taiwan was part of China; it did not challenge that position and expressed interest in a peaceful resolution. Liaison offices were established in 1973.

    Full normalization occurred on January 1, 1979, under President Jimmy Carter. The US recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China, ended official diplomatic relations and the mutual defense treaty with the ROC, and withdrew remaining military forces from Taiwan, while maintaining unofficial cultural, commercial, and other ties. Deng Xiaoping visited the United States later that month. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), which commits the US to provide Taiwan with defensive arms sufficient for self-defense and to treat threats to Taiwan as of grave concern.

    A third key document, the 1982 August 17 Communiqué, addressed US arms sales to Taiwan in the context of gradual reduction while affirming the One China framework.

    Engagement, Trade Growth, and Recurring Frictions (1980s–2010s)

    Deng’s economic reforms and China’s opening to foreign investment produced rapid trade growth. The US granted most-favored-nation (later permanent normal trade relations) status; China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. The relationship featured cooperation on issues such as counterterrorism after 9/11 and some climate efforts, alongside disputes over Taiwan, human rights (especially after the 1989 Tiananmen events, which prompted US sanctions), intellectual property, the 2001 EP-3 spy-plane incident, and military modernization.

    Under Presidents Obama and Xi Jinping, the US pursued a “rebalance” or pivot to Asia. Maritime disputes in the South China Sea, cyber issues, and competing visions of regional order became more prominent. The 2014 joint climate announcement was a notable cooperative moment.

    Strategic Competition (2010s–2020s)

    The Trump administration (2017–2021) launched a major trade war with tariffs on Chinese goods, labeled China a strategic competitor, restricted technology transfers, and highlighted intellectual property, forced technology transfer, and industrial policy concerns. The Biden administration continued a competitive approach with export controls on advanced semiconductors, strengthened alliances (Quad, AUKUS), and maintained support for Taiwan while seeking managed competition and limited cooperation on climate and global health.

    Core structural issues remain: Taiwan’s status and cross-Strait stability, South China Sea and East China Sea disputes, technology competition (especially AI and semiconductors), trade imbalances and supply-chain security, human rights, and differing views on global order. The US One China policy continues to acknowledge the Chinese position without fully endorsing it, while the Taiwan Relations Act underpins unofficial but substantial ties and arms sales.

    Current Context (November 2026)

    As of November 18, 2026, President Donald Trump has arrived in Shenzhen for the APEC summit. Chinese President Xi Jinping personally greeted him at the airport with a red-carpet welcome, honor guard, and a brief embrace—an unusual personal reception that reciprocated Trump’s earlier greeting of Xi at Joint Base Andrews. A trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled, with expected discussion of trade, nuclear issues, the war in Ukraine, Iran, Taiwan, and AI-related technology controls. This high-level engagement occurs against a backdrop of ongoing strategic competition and economic interdependence.

    The relationship has evolved from near-total isolation to dense economic and diplomatic contact, yet it remains defined by competing interests, power dynamics, and unresolved questions over Taiwan and the regional order. Key primary documents are the three US-China communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act.