Mohsen Rezaee is a senior Iranian politician and former military officer who has served as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council since August.
Both Rezaei and Rezaee are correct spellings of the same Persian surname (رضایی), but Rezaei is much more common.
Rezaei's Strategy
Mohsen Rezaee’s oil strategy treats the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding Persian Gulf waters as Iran’s primary remaining source of leverage after the collapse of a June 2026 memorandum of understanding with the United States. He presents the waterway as “completely closed” under Iranian armed-forces control, with daily traffic reduced from more than 100 ships to 7–8 vessels that mainly carry essential goods for Iran. Unauthorized tankers attempting nighttime passages near the Omani coast are struck but not sunk, a choice Rezaee attributes to environmental risk rather than a desire to keep oil flowing. The strategy has three operational layers. First, Iran is preparing to declare an expanded restricted zone that begins at the U.S. naval blockade line and extends into the Persian Gulf toward loading terminals; vessels entering without coordination will be added to an Iranian sanctions list that raises insurance premiums and blocks future passage.
Second, Rezaee has floated transit fees or “service costs” so that the expense of security, environmental protection, and insurance falls on oil shippers rather than Iranian taxpayers. Third, he has threatened that continued U.S. “economic warfare” will result in zero oil leaving the Persian Gulf by any route. Diplomatically, the strait functions as both pressure tool and guarantee. Reopening is conditioned on an end to the U.S. blockade, sanctions relief, release of frozen assets, war-damage compensation, and a region-wide ceasefire that includes Lebanon and Gaza. Rezaei has said Iran can reopen the strait and then close it again if Washington fails to deliver, keeping the chokepoint as a reusable instrument. At the same time Iran is developing land corridors and alternative export routes so that its own oil sales continue even while global transit is disrupted. The approach assumes that raising costs and uncertainty for global energy markets will force concessions faster than military or economic pressure can isolate Iran. Whether the market’s growing diversification and strategic reserves blunt that leverage remains the central test of the strategy.
Second, Rezaee has floated transit fees or “service costs” so that the expense of security, environmental protection, and insurance falls on oil shippers rather than Iranian taxpayers. Third, he has threatened that continued U.S. “economic warfare” will result in zero oil leaving the Persian Gulf by any route. Diplomatically, the strait functions as both pressure tool and guarantee. Reopening is conditioned on an end to the U.S. blockade, sanctions relief, release of frozen assets, war-damage compensation, and a region-wide ceasefire that includes Lebanon and Gaza. Rezaei has said Iran can reopen the strait and then close it again if Washington fails to deliver, keeping the chokepoint as a reusable instrument. At the same time Iran is developing land corridors and alternative export routes so that its own oil sales continue even while global transit is disrupted. The approach assumes that raising costs and uncertainty for global energy markets will force concessions faster than military or economic pressure can isolate Iran. Whether the market’s growing diversification and strategic reserves blunt that leverage remains the central test of the strategy.
The USA was NOT asking for talks with Iran.
